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In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of 
divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate 
shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a 
supermajority rule, equal taxation, exemption of the agenda setter from taxation, and a ban on 
subsidies. In the presence of aggregate shocks to benefits or to costs of public-good provision, 
tax-sensitive majority rules, where the size of the required majority depends on the aggregate 
tax revenues, yield first-best allocations if a monotonicity condition is met. Finally, we 
explore the potential of first-best constitutions to induce voluntary participation by 
compensating agents belonging to the minority. 
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comments. 1 Introduction
Democratic constitutions are a set of rules that must satisfy the liberal-democracy con-
straint, which consists of the following sub-constraints: every agent has the same chance
of making a proposal; every individual has the right to vote; only yes/no votes are al-
lowed at the voting stages; every individual is allowed to abstain from proposal-making.
In this paper we examine whether and how democratic constitutions can achieve so-
cially desirable outcomes when a polity chooses among a continuum of feasible levels for
a public good. A democratic constitution that avoids under- or over-provision of public
goods is called a ﬁrst-best constitution.
The game
We consider public-good provision and public-good ﬁnancing in a large-economy ver-
sion of Hellwig (2005), embedded in a four-stage game. In the constitutional period,
the society decides unanimously about the constitutional principles governing legislative
decision-making. There is uncertainty regarding who will beneﬁt how much from the
public good. Moreover, there may be aggregate uncertainty regarding the beneﬁts and
costs of the public good. At the start of the legislative period, citizens observe the
realization of aggregate beneﬁts and costs as well as their own utility and decide simul-
taneously whether to apply for agenda-setting or not. Among all citizens who apply,
one citizen is determined by fair randomization to set the agenda. The agenda-setter
proposes a project-ﬁnancing package. Citizens decide simultaneously whether to accept
the proposal or not. This game is a direct translation of the four sub-constraints that
constitute the liberal-democracy constraint. We explore the potential of a democratic
constitution restricted to this kind of game. A democratic constitution is a set of rules
specifying (i) how the agenda-setter is treated, (ii) which types of proposal are allowed,
and (iii) how the society decides on a proposal.
Main results
The ﬁrst insight of this paper is that the combination of the four following rules yields
eﬃcient provision of public goods when aggregate shocks are absent: (1) a supermajority
rule under which the adoption of a particular level of a public good requires a prespeciﬁed
vote-share; (2) a tax rule that levies the same tax rate on all individuals except the
proposal-maker, who is exempted from taxation; (3) subsidies are forbidden; (4) the
agenda-setter has to pay a ﬁxed amount for agenda-setting.
2The second insight is that in the case of aggregate shocks to beneﬁts and costs, the
replacement of supermajority rules by tax-sensitive majority rules can preserve the ef-
ﬁciency of democratic constitutions. With a tax-sensitive majority rule, the majority
required to put a proposal through is higher, the higher the aggregate tax revenues in
a proposal are. As long as it holds that a higher amount of taxes in one state of the
world is associated with a higher share of beneﬁciaries in comparison with the status
quo, then appropriately designed tax-sensitive majority rules – in conjunction with the
other constitutional rules – lead to ﬁrst-best allocation.
The third insight of this paper is that it is always possible to ﬁnd a democratic con-
stitution that implements a Pareto-improvement over the status quo. There are also
circumstances for which we can ﬁnd ﬁrst-best constitutions that fully compensate vot-
ing losers, so that the socially optimal level of the public good can be implemented as a
Pareto-improvement.
In this novel constitution, two rules deserve particular attention. By making the required
majority threshold a strictly monotonically increasing function of aggregate tax revenues,
an agenda-setter cannot induce the adoption of an amount of the public good that is
higher than socially desirable. The reason is that the required majority varies with the
socially optimal amount of public goods, measured by the aggregate tax revenues in
diﬀerent states of the world. In addition, the required majority is set as equal to the
share of individuals who strictly beneﬁt from the proposal. By exempting the proposal-
maker from taxation, while requiring equal tax treatment for all other individuals, the
proposal-maker is forced to propose the highest possible level of the public good that
would be adopted. This rule avoids under-provision of public goods.
Motivation and relation to the literature
My paper is a study in constructive constitutional economics, as outlined in the classic
contribution by Buchanan & Tullock (1962). Under a veil of ignorance, individuals
decide which rules should govern legislative decision-making. In a long tradition dating
back to Rousseau (1762), Buchanan & Tullock (1962) have examined the costs and
beneﬁts of majority rules chosen by a society operating under a veil of ignorance.
Aghion & Bolton (2003) have explicitly introduced contractual incompleteness for the
design of optimal majority rules. They show how the simple or qualiﬁed majority rule
can help to overcome ex-post vested interests. Gersbach (2009) has introduced the
liberal-democracy constraint and explored democratic mechanisms for indivisible public
3goods. He has shown how increasingly sophisticated treatment and agenda rules, in
conjunction with ﬂexible or double majority rules, can yield ﬁrst-best allocations for
binary decisions.
We also use the liberal-democracy constraint to deﬁne the set of admissible mechanisms
in this paper. In contrast to Gersbach (2009), however, we consider a model in which
a society chooses among a continuum of possible public-good levels and we allow that
beneﬁts and costs may be aﬀected by aggregate shocks during the legislative period. We
introduce two novel rules which help to construct ﬁrst-best allocations in such circum-
stances: aggregate-tax-sensitive majority rules and exemption of the proposal-maker
from taxation. These rules, together with the other rules discussed in the introduction,
avoid under- and over-provision of public good provision in circumstances with many
diﬀerent possible levels of public goods. Moreover, they induce that democratic public
good provision adjusts optimally to ﬂuctuations in costs and beneﬁts of public goods.
The twin problem of societies – the risk of tyranny by the majority and the risk of
legislation-blocking by the minority, as outlined in Aghion & Bolton (2003) – has been
further examined in Aghion, Alesina & Trebbi (2004), who derive optimal supermajority
governing rules that balance both of these dangers. Harstad (2005) develops a theory of
majority rules based on the incentives of members of a club to invest in order to beneﬁt
from anticipated projects. Optimal majority rules balance two opposing forces. Large
required majorities provide little incentive to invest because of hold-up problems, while
the members of small majorities invest too much to become members of a majority coali-
tion. We use aggregate-tax-sensitive majority rules to balance the power of majorities
and minorities, in order to avoid under- or overprovision of public-good provision.
As a workhorse, we will use the large-economy model of Hellwig (2005). Our analysis is,
however, more closely related to Hellwig (2003) who has examined public-good provision
with many participants. In Section 5 we will discuss in detail how our results relate to
Hellwig (2003).
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we introduce the model and the
constitutional rules we want to use. In section 3, we study ﬁrst-best constitutions when
aggregate uncertainty is absent. In section 4, we examine ﬁrst-best constitutions when
beneﬁts or costs of public goods are subject to aggregate shocks. In section 5, we explore
the possibility of subsidizing voting losers to achieve voluntary participation. Section 6
concludes.
42 Model and Constitutional Rules
2.1 Model
We consider a social-choice problem in public-good provision and ﬁnancing in the large-
economy model of Hellwig (2005). Time is indexed by τ = 0,1. The ﬁrst period τ = 0
is the constitutional period, when a society of risk-neutral members decides how public-
good provision and ﬁnancing should be governed in the legislative period τ = 1. The
society consists of a continuum of voters represented by [0,1].
In the legislative period τ = 1, each citizen is endowed with y units of a private con-
sumption good. Hence the society has an aggregate production capacity of Y , which
can be used to provide an amount C of aggregate consumption of a private commodity
and a public good of level Q. The resource constraint amounts to
C + K(Q) = Y.
The cost function K(·) is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly convex, continuously
diﬀerentiable, with K(0) = 0, K0(0) = 0 and limQ→∞ K0(Q) = ∞. Citizens are assumed
to be risk-neutral.
A citizen derives utility zQ from the level of public good Q. The parameter z is the
citizen’s private information. From the perspective of the other citizens, or of the system
as a whole, z is the realization of a random variable that takes values in [0,1] and has a
probability distribution F(·) with mean ¯ z and density f(·). Applying a suitable version
of the law of large numbers, F(·) can be interpreted as the distribution of z in the
population, and ¯ z is its mean. A citizen will be associated with his preference parameter
z. As a shortcut, such a citizen is called citizen z.
The public good is ﬁnanced by taxes, and citizens may be subsidized. We use t(z)
and s(z) respectively to denote the tax payment or subsidy of a citizen with preference
parameter z. Given a level Q of public-good provision, the utility of citizen z in the
legislative period is given by
U(z) = y + zQ − t(z) + s(z).
Throughout the paper, we assume that s(·) and t(·) are integrable functions. We assume
5that y is suﬃciently large for the individuals to be able to pay the taxes proposed under
any of the constitutions we will discuss. Finally, the budget constraint on the society in
the legislative period is given by
Z 1
0




The aggregate tax revenue is denoted by T.
2.2 Socially optimal solutions
As citizens are risk-neutral, the optimal level of the public good, from an ex ante point





zQ f(z) dz − K(Q)
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∗) = ¯ z. (1)
Hence, at the socially optimal level of the public good, the marginal cost of provision
equals the expected marginal beneﬁt. The ﬁrst-best allocation does not determine the
ﬁnancing scheme and hence neither the taxes nor the subsidy functions. The sole con-
straint is the budget constraint. We also note that all individuals with z ≥ ¯ z beneﬁt
from public-good provision if the costs are shared equally, i.e. zQ∗ > K(Q∗). To prove





since K(0) = 0 and K00(Q) > 0. Hence, z = K0(Q∗) >
K(Q∗)
Q∗ , so individuals with z ≥ z
will strictly beneﬁt from the provision of Q∗.
62.3 Democratic provision
We use the liberal-democracy constraint, which requires that the legislative process op-
erates under the following sub-constraints:
• Every agent has the same chance to make a proposal.
• Every individual has the right to vote.
• Only yes/no messages are allowed at the voting stages.
• Every individual is allowed to abstain from voting or applying for proposal-making.
Several remarks are in order. First, Gersbach (2009), drawing on the philosophical
foundations of democracy, provides an extensive justiﬁcation of this constraint. Second,
every citizen has the right to refrain from applying for agenda-setting. Once a citizen
has applied and is selected, however, he may have to pay a cost, and thus becoming
an agenda setter may be costly. The precise formalization of the liberal-democracy
constraint is embodied in the game in the next subsection.
2.4 The Game
We consider the standard game that represents the sequence of constitutional and leg-
islative periods:
Stage 0: In the constitutional period, the polity decides by the unanimity rule about the
constitutional rules that govern the legislative processes.
Stage 1: At the start of the legislative period, citizens observe their preference param-
eter z. Citizens decide simultaneously whether to apply for agenda-setting
(ψ(z) = 1 or not ψ(z) = 0).
Stage 2: Among all citizens who apply, one citizen is determined randomly to set the
agenda. The preference parameter of the agenda-setter is denoted by
za ∈ [0,1]. The agenda-setter proposes a project/ﬁnancing package (Q,t(·),s(·)).
Denote this choice by Pza.
Stage 3: Given Pza, citizens decide simultaneously whether to accept the proposal
(δz(Pza) = 1 or not δz(Pza) = 0). The polity decides about the proposal ac-
cording to some majority rule speciﬁed in the constitution.
7The game fulﬁlls the conditions constituting the liberal-democracy constraint. If nobody
applies for agenda-setting, the status quo will prevail, which is characterized by Q = 0,
t(·) = s(·) = 0. Hence the utility of a citizen in this case is y.
We use P = (Pz)z∈[0,1]:ψ(z)=1 to denote the set of possible proposals. The set of strategies





In deriving an equilibrium, we face the problem that as we have a continuum of voters an
individual vote has no inﬂuence on the outcome. To describe the application and voting
outcome in our model, we use the weak dominance criterion that mimics the optimal
voting and application behavior of a society with a large but ﬁnite number of agents (see
Gersbach (2005)). In our model, voting is a simple binary decision, so individuals have
nothing to gain from strategic voting. Hence the above criterion implies that agents vote
sincerely, i.e. agents will vote for their most-preferred alternative.
It is obvious that sincere voting on a proposal selects a unique voting equilibrium. Hence
we can use the weak dominance criterion for the decision on whether to apply for agenda-
setting (stage 1). This concept is applied in the following way: We ﬁrst look at the set
of agents who can strictly improve their utility by making a proposal, compared to the
status quo. In all of our constitutions, this set will be non-empty, and those agents
will apply for agenda-setting. Moreover, in all of our constitutions an agenda-setter can
never fare better if somebody other than himself makes a proposal. As a consequence,
all individuals will apply for agenda-setting.
To simplify the exposition, we assume as a tie-breaking rule that, if an agent z is indif-
ferent between applying for agenda-setting and renouncing such an application, he will
apply for agenda-setting, as we also assume that a citizen who is indiﬀerent between
voting yes or no will choose the former.
In what follows we always assume sincere voting and the above behavior regarding
agenda-setting. We are now ready to characterize the expected level of the public good
that a particular constitution can deliver. We say that a constitution C implements level
Q if all possible perfect Bayesian equilibria under constitution C that satisfy the above
reﬁnements and tie-breaking rules yield Q.
We call a constitution ﬁrst-best if it implements the level Q∗. To prove that the consti-
tutions we propose are ﬁrst-best, we show that
8• all individuals apply for agenda-setting,
• each agenda-setter makes a proposal involving Q∗,
• this proposal will be adopted.
We ﬁnally note that in the constitutional period (stage 0), the society decides about
the constitution by the unanimity rule. It is obvious that if a set of constitutional rules
yields a ﬁrst-best allocation, it will be approved unanimously in stage 0, since individuals
are identical at this point and risk-neutral.
2.5 Constitutional principles
The rules of the constitution have to specify
1. whether there is to be special treatment for the agenda-setter (agenda-setter
rules);
2. restrictions on the agendas, i.e. deﬁnition of all constitutional agendas (agenda
rules). An agenda consists of a project proposal and a ﬁnancing package;
3. how the society decides on a proposal (decision rules).
We consider the following rules that will enable us to construct ﬁrst-best constitutions.
Agenda-setter rules
• Costs of agenda-setting [CA(b)]
The agenda-setter pays a ﬁxed amount b ≥ 0.
Agenda rules
• Equal taxation of citizens except the agenda-setter [ETT−za]
All citizens except the agenda-setter have to pay the same taxes.
• No subsidies [NS]
The agenda-setter is not allowed to propose any subsidies.
• Budget constraint [BC]
The ﬁnancing package must satisfy the budget constraint.
9Decision rules
• m-majority rule [M(m)]
If a proposal to change the status quo receives at least a majority of m percent of
the citizens (0 ≤ m ≤ 1), the proposal will be adopted.
• Tax-sensitive majority rule [FM(m(T))]
Under a tax-sensitive majority rule, the required majority to support a proposal
depends on aggregate taxes T =
R 1
0 t(z)dz.
A priori we allow m to be smaller than 1
2. In section 3 we will discuss whether it
is sensible to restrict m to m ≥ 1
2. Note that the tax-sensitive majority rule may
depend on information generated by the proposal. By contrast, the rules [CA(b)] and
[M(m)] do not depend on the proposal but may depend on other parameters. We will






the constitutional rules. {δ∗
z(Pza)}z∈[0,1] denotes the equilibrium voting strategies of all
individuals if Pza is proposed.
Throughout the paper we assume that if a proposal violates the budget constraint, the
status quo will prevail. If taxes exceed project costs and subsidies, we assume that excess
revenues will be paid back uniformly to citizens, with the exception of the agenda-setter,
as lump-sum transfer. As agenda-setters will never have an incentive to make a proposal
with an unbalanced budget, we neglect this possibility in the following.
3 First-Best Constitutions
3.1 The main theorem
In this section we explore the structure of ﬁrst-best constitutions. For the remainder of
the paper we use AV (Q) =
K(Q)
Q to denote the average cost function.
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Constitution C1 is ﬁrst-best.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the Appendix.
The intuition for the result is as follows. We ﬁrst stress that the cost ˆ b paid by the
agenda setter is independent of the proposal. As the agenda setter is exempted from
taxation, he is therefore interested in the maximal level of public goods that is adopted
by the polity.
Consider next an individual z with zQ∗ > K(Q∗). As observed in section 2.2, such
individuals exist. For these individuals the proposal (Q = Q∗,t−za = K(Q∗)) is optimal,
since this is the maximal level of the public good supported by at least ˆ m voters. An
agenda-setter can avoid bearing taxes, but he has to pay ˆ b = K(Q∗). Hence individuals
with zQ∗ > K(Q∗) are strictly better oﬀ with respect to the status quo if they can be
the proposal-makers. Hence they apply for agenda-setting.
Consider an individual with zQ∗ ≤ K(Q∗). If he can set the agenda, he can at most
obtain zQ∗ −ˆ b. If he does not set the agenda, he will obtain zQ∗ − K(Q∗) = zQ∗ −ˆ b.
According to our tie-breaking rules, those individuals will apply for proposal-making
and will propose (Q = Q∗,t−za = K(Q∗)). Accordingly, all individuals will apply for
agenda-setting.
We stress that constitution C1 with any value of ˆ b in [0,K(Q∗)] yields ﬁrst-best alloca-
tions. A similar observation holds for all constitutions developed in this paper. In order
to ensure that all agenda-setters will also contribute to the provision of public goods,
we set ˆ b at the highest level that guarantees ﬁrst-best allocations.1
A remark regarding the size of ˆ m is in order. A priori ˆ m can be smaller than 1
2. As
long as undertaking the public project is irreversible, m < 1
2 is feasible. If, however, the
1This approach neutralizes the beneﬁts from agenda-setting, and thus indirectly imposes equal burden
sharing in this section. In a setting with a ﬁnite number of citizens, a particular level of agenda-
setting costs may be important to balance the budget.
11static process in this paper is repeated and the public good can be undone at little cost,
ˆ m < 1
2 would invite cycling. In such cases it is sensible to restrict ˆ m to ˆ m ≥ 1
2.2
3.2 An example






1 if z ∈ [0,1],
0 otherwise.
Then, using ¯ z = 1
















We note that a majority rule with a 75%-vote threshold is needed to pass a proposal.
An agenda-setter will propose (Q∗ = 1
4a,t−za = 1
16a). For voter z = 1
2, beneﬁts from




4 First-best Constitution and Aggregate Uncertainty
In this section we explore which ﬁrst-best constitutions exist when there is aggregate
uncertainty regarding costs, beneﬁts, or jointly regarded costs and beneﬁts.
Diﬀerent states of nature, e.g. diﬀerent costs, imply diﬀerent levels of socially desirable
public good provision. Accordingly, the aggregate tax revenue may diﬀer. In this case,
we will use a tax-sensitive majority rule [FM(m(T))] under which the required majority
2To ensure that such constitutions still yield ﬁrst-best allocations, the tax rule has to be modiﬁed. A
fraction of individuals does not pay taxes, while the remaining group of individuals shares the tax
burden equally.
12depends on aggregate tax revenue. It will turn out that such rules can be constructed
in a way that the majority requirement optimally adjusts to aggregate events.
To obtain ﬁrst-best constitutions including this rule, we need the following monotonicity
condition:
(MC): Suppose that socially optimal tax revenues associated with two diﬀerent states of
nature, say state 1 and state 2 satisfy T 1 > T 2 then the shares of individuals beneﬁting
from the provision of the socially optimal levels of public goods in both states satisfy
m1 ≥ m2.
The (MC) states that a higher amount of taxes in one state of the world is associated
with an equal or higher share of beneﬁciaries relative to the status quo. Note that in
case of equal aggregate tax revenues, no conditions are imposed.
4.1 Aggregate uncertainty regarding beneﬁts
In this section we consider the case of aggregate uncertainty regarding the beneﬁts of
the public good. In particular, we assume that a citizen derives utility V = dzQ from
the level of the public good. The random variable z is the same as before, while d is
an aggregate shock. In particular, d is either dh with probability p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) or dl
(dl < dh) with probability 1 − p.
We assume that the aggregate shock is realized after the constitution has been put in
place, but before the legislative process starts. The socially optimal allocation is now
characterized by two levels of public goods (Q∗h,Q∗l) given by dl¯ z = K0(Q∗l), dh¯ z =
K0(Q∗h), depending on whether dh or dl has been realized. We note that Q∗h > Q∗l and
hence T h = K(Q∗h) > T l = K(Q∗l).
Moreover, we introduce
ˆ m





for X = h,l.
We note that ˆ mh and ˆ ml are equal to the shares of individuals who beneﬁt from the
proposal (Q∗h,K(Q∗h)) and (Q∗l,K(Q∗l)), where the states h or l occur respectively.
13Therefore the monotonicity condition (MC) requires that
ˆ m
h ≥ ˆ m
l (2)
has to hold. The condition states that the higher level of socially optimal tax revenue T h
in the event of dh is associated with a higher share of citizens supporting the proposal
(Q = Q∗h,t−za = K(Q∗h)) than the share of individuals supporting (Q = Q∗l,t−za =
K(Q∗l)) if dl occurs.
















and is thus ensured if dlnK(Q)/dlnQ is weakly monotonically increasing.














ˆ mh if T > T l,
ˆ ml otherwise.
The following proposition shows that C2 can yield ﬁrst-best allocations independently of
whether dh or dl occurs.
Proposition 2
Suppose (MC) holds. Then constitution C2 is ﬁrst-best.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the Appendix. The intuition for the result runs as
follows: Suppose that dl is realized. Any agenda-setter will propose (Q∗l,t−za = K(Q∗l)),
which will be supported by a share of ˆ ml voters. Since m∗(T l) = ˆ ml, the proposal
14is adopted. A higher amount of the public good will gain less than ˆ m voters and
thus will not be adopted, as ˆ mh ≥ ˆ ml. Suppose that dh is realized. The proposal
(Q∗h,t−za = K(Q∗h)) will be made by an agenda-setter, as it gains just ˆ mh voters.
We observe that the scheme m∗(T) has a built-in ﬂexibility, as the majority threshold
depends on the aggregate tax outlays. In equilibrium, these tax revenues will vary
according to whether dh or dl occurs. This feedback from aggregate tax revenues to
the majority threshold means that the ﬁrst-best allocations can be produced in both
states.
We note that we can generalize the result to more complicated discrete or continuous
distributions of d as long as (MC) holds. If (MC) holds, the ensuing function m∗(T) is
monotonically increasing and thus we can apply the construction in Proposition 2.
We illustrate Proposition 2 with the same example we introduced in the last section. We
assume, in addition, that dl = 1
2 and dh = 3
2. The socially optimal levels of the public
good are Q∗l = 1
8a,Q∗h = 3
8a. Hence T l = 1
64a,T h = 9
64a.
ˆ m

































Hence (MC) holds, and constitution C2 yields a socially eﬃcient outcome.
4.2 Aggregate uncertainty regarding costs
We next consider the opposite case, aggregate uncertainty regarding the costs of public
goods. In particular, we assume that the cost of providing the public good is ωK(Q).
The random variable represents the aggregate shock: ω can be either ωh with probability
p, or ωl with probability 1−p, where ωh > ωl. Again, the aggregate shock is realized at
the beginning of the legislative process.
The socially optimal allocation is characterized by two levels of public goods, Q∗h,Q∗l,
deﬁned by ¯ z = ωhK0(Q∗h), ¯ z = ωlK0(Q∗l). We note that Q∗h < Q∗l.























so the requirement is that the tax levels and the corresponding fractions of supporting
individuals be “co-monotonic.” We note that (MC) is always fulﬁlled for cost functions














= 1 − F(¯ z/n)
is independent of ωX.


















max{ˆ mh, ˆ ml} if T > min{T h,T l},
min{ˆ mh, ˆ ml} otherwise.
We obtain
Proposition 3
Suppose (MC) holds. Then constitution C3 is ﬁrst-best.
16The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the Appendix. The intuition is similar to the
case where there is aggregate uncertainty regarding beneﬁts. The majority rule is a step
function, and in equilibrium the required majority threshold becomes contingent on the
aggregate state. This yields socially eﬃcient allocations.
For our parametrized example we choose ωh = 3
2 and ωl = 1
2. The socially optimal
amounts of public goods are Q∗h = 1
6a and Q∗l = 1
2a, therefore T h = 1
2a and T l = 1
8a ,
ˆ m

































We now give a second example, this time with T h = T l, so that the monotonicity
condition is trivially satisﬁed. Suppose that K(Q) = e2Q and F(z) = z for all z ∈ [0,1],
i.e. z is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. As before, ωl = 1
2 and ωh = 3
2. Then, using
z = 1



































In this case, the corresponding majorities diﬀer:
ˆ m







Q∗h < ˆ m
l = 1 −
T
Q∗l where T := T
h = T
l
as Q∗l > Q∗h. According to Proposition 3, constitution C3 is ﬁrst-best.
174.3 Joint aggregate uncertainty
In this section we consider the most demanding case, joint aggregate uncertainty regard-
ing beneﬁts and costs.
In particular, we assume that the citizens’ utility is dzQ with d being dh or dl, dh > dl,
while the aggregate cost of providing the amount Q is ωK(Q) with ω being ωh or ωl,

























Moreover, Q∗hh > Q∗ll if and only if dh
ωh > dl






The ﬁrst index i of T ij denotes the level of beneﬁts, the second index j denotes the level
of costs. It is not possible in general to determine how T ij relates to all other T lk for
i,j,k,l ∈ {h,l}. For example, it is obvious that T hl = ωlK(Q∗hl) > ωlK(Q∗ll) = T ll, as
Q∗hl > Q∗ll, but without further assumptions we cannot say whether T hl = ωlK(Q∗hl) >
ωhK(Q∗hh) = T hh holds, although Q∗hl > Q∗hh is true as well.
We deﬁne
ˆ m










exist such that T X > T Y and mY > mX. Thus the monotonicity condition implies that






















> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
mD if T ≤ T D,
mC if T D < T ≤ T C,
mB if T C < T ≤ T B,
mA if T B < T.
The monotonicity condition ensures that with this constitution a fraction of at least
mX of supporting voters is needed to bring through a proposal that involves a tax level
strictly higher than T X. We point out that this statement holds true, even if one of
the cases in the deﬁnition of m∗ collapses to the empty set. Assume, for example, the
parameters are such that T C = T B. Then, to bring through a proposal involving a tax
level strictly higher that T B, one would need a fraction of at least mA ≥ mB supporting
voters.
This characteristic of the constitution is the key to the following Proposition:
Proposition 4
Suppose (MC) holds. Then constitution C4 is ﬁrst-best.
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the Appendix.
Example 1
For the example introduced in section 3.2, i.e. K(Q) = aQ2 and F(x) = x, we may
choose ωl = 1
2,ωh = 3
2,dh = 3
2 and dl = 1
2. The socially optimal levels of the public
good are Q∗hh = 1
4a = Q∗ll, Q∗hl = 3
4a and Q∗lh = 1
12a. It follows that T hh = 3
32a, T ll =
1
32a, T hl = 9
32a and T lh = 3






The required majorities are again given by
ˆ m
hl = ˆ m
hh = ˆ m





Hence constitution C4 is ﬁrst-best.
19Example 2
As a second example, take the same set-up as in example 1, but use K(Q) = e
1
8Q − 1
instead of K(Q) = aQ2. As K0(Q) = 1
8e
1
8Q we obtain Q∗ij = 8log(4di
ωj ). Separately for
each possible state, the socially optimal levels of public good are given by
Q
∗hh = Q
∗ll = 8log(4) ≈ 11.1, Q





i.e. we have Q∗hl > Q∗hh = Q∗ll > Q∗lh. The general form of the corresponding tax level


















so T hl > T hh > T ll > T lh. Finally, the associated mij = 1 − Tij
diQ∗ij are given by
m
hh = m
ll ≈ 0.73, m
hl ≈ 0.82 and m
lh ≈ 0.57.
The ordering is given by mhl > mhh = mll > mlh. Again constitution C4 implements a
ﬁrst-best allocation.
5 Ex Post Constraints
Common to all our constitutions is the property that individuals with low valuations
of the public good are worse oﬀ with democratic provision of public goods than with
the status quo. In principle, as democratic constitutions are chosen by unanimity under
a veil of ignorance, ex post constraints do not need to be honored, as the constitution
legitimizes the government’s power to tax people.
In this section, we nevertheless explore whether ex post constraints could be honored.
The reason is threefold. First, individuals may leave ex post the jurisdiction if they suﬀer
too much. Second, as in Hellwig (2005), citizens may opt for social welfare functions
with inequality aversion. Third, honoring ex post constraints allows us to relate the
constitutions to the standard mechanism literature.
In particular, we explore in this section the scope of subsidizing voting losers without
sacriﬁcing the eﬃciency properties of the constitution. In particular, we assume that all
individuals who voted against the proposal will receive a subsidy sL > 0. We denote
20that by the rule SL(sL). In a continuum model, such a rule would destroy the eﬃciency
properties of our constitutions, as knowing that they have no impact on the voting
outcome, individuals would oppose any proposal in order to receive sL. In a ﬁnite
version of our economy this is less clear, as individuals may be pivotal. To explore the
potential of our constitutions under such circumstances, we keep the tractable structure
of our continuum framework, but we assume the
No-switching assumption: All individuals in a subset Ω ⊆ [0,1] will support a proposal P
if the following conditions are met:
(i) All individuals i ∈ Ω are better oﬀ with P than with the status quo. All i ∈ [0;1]\Ω
are worse oﬀ with the proposal than without.
(ii) Proposal P is adopted if it is seconded by all agents in Ω.
(iii) Proposal P is rejected if a subset of Ω with positive measure votes P down.
The no-switching assumption mimics being pivotal in a ﬁnite population. It is the best
possible assumption for constitutions to work in the continuum version of our model.3
Our main result in this section shows that, with this assumption, participation may be
eased and general voluntary participation and ﬁrst-best allocation may be compatible.
We use the model variant with no aggregate risk.
Proposition 5








ˆ b = 0
yields a positive level of Q. The resulting allocation is a Pareto-improvement over
the status quo.
(ii) There are constellations (e.g. f(z) = 1, K(Q) = aQ2), an sL > 0 and ˆ m, such that
˜ C1 yields Q∗ and the allocation is a Pareto-improvement over the status quo.
(iii) There are constellations for which there exists no sL > 0 and ˆ m, such that ˜ C1
yields Q∗ and no individual is worse oﬀ compared to the status quo.
3To ensure no-switching in a continuum model, one would need open ballots and coordination of voting
behavior, such that switching by one individual i ∈ Ω would simultaneously trigger deviation by a
subset in Ω of positive measure.
21The proof is given in the Appendix. Proposition 5 shows that, under the favorable
no-swithing assumption, democratic constitutions can engineer a Pareto-improvement.
When z is uniformly distributed it is even possible for democratic constitutions to si-
multaneously yield ﬁrst-best levels of Q and voluntary participation.
When we allow voluntary participation, we address the same question as Hellwig (2003),
albeit with an inﬁnite number of agents. It is thus important to relate the above Propo-
sition to his results.
We ﬁrst observe that the impossibility result of Hellwig (Proposition 3.10), according to
which incentive-compatibility obviates the implementation of ﬁrst-best outcomes, does
not apply in our framework, as Hellwig’s argument is based on the agents’ uncertainty
about the amount of the public good that will be provided. This uncertainty, in turn,
results from the agents’ uncertainty about the actual distribution of types in the society.
The uncertainty vanishes if – as is the case in our model – the number of agents tends
to inﬁnity. In the limit, the implementation of ﬁrst-best outcomes may be possible, as
is shown by the example given above in Proposition 5, part (ii).
Second, Proposition 6.1 of Hellwig’s paper states that when the number of agents be-
comes large, the quantity of the public good provided under a second-best, incentive-
compatible mechanism follows approximately a (truncated) normal distribution around
the ﬁrst-best quantity. The variance is proportional to n when the utility is linear and
costs are quadratic. For our model – in which the set of agents is normalized to the
unit interval – to be obtained as a limit of a model with ﬁnitely many agents, quantities
must be rescaled with 1/n, which gives a variance proportional to 1/n. In the limit, the
variance vanishes, and the mechanism implements the ﬁrst-best outcome. Our example
is thus also in line with Hellwig’s result in Proposition 6.1.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis has shed light on the potential of liberal democracies for achieving ﬁrst-
best allocations. Numerous issues deserve further attention in this research program.
Most importantly, it will be useful to investigate optimal constitutions for circumstances
where the monotonicity condition is violated.
22Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1: We ﬁrst consider individuals for which zQ∗ > K(Q∗). Such individuals always
exist, as set out in section 2.2. Suppose that such an individual applies for agenda-
setting and is recognized. We claim that he will propose (Q = Q∗,t−za = K(Q∗)). For
notational convenience, as all proposals will involve s(·) ≡ 0, the subsidy function is
neglected in the following.
This proposal will be accepted, as a share of ˆ m = 1 − F(AV (Q∗)) voters are better oﬀ
than with the status quo and will thus support the proposal. The utility of the agenda-
setter is zQ∗ −ˆ b = zQ∗ −K(Q∗) > 0. A proposal (Q < Q∗,t−za = K(Q)) would also be
accepted but generates smaller utility zQ − ˆ b = zQ − K(Q∗) for the agenda-setter. A
proposal (Q > Q∗,t−za = K(Q)) would not be adopted as the share of supporting voters
is smaller than ˆ m. Hence individuals with zQ∗ > K(Q∗) strictly beneﬁt from setting
the agenda, relative to the status quo, and will thus apply for agenda-setting and make
a proposal (Q = Q∗,t−za = K(Q∗)) if recognized.
Step 2: Consider an individual with zQ∗ ≤ K(Q∗). Suppose that he applies for agenda-
setting and is chosen to make a proposal. As he has to pay ˆ b = K(Q∗) and can renounce
taxing himself, the same considerations as in Step 1 imply that the best proposal is (Q =
Q∗,t−za = K(Q∗)). According to our tie-breaking rule, all individuals with zQ∗ ≤ K(Q∗)
apply for agenda-setting, as they are indiﬀerent between applying and not applying. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1: Suppose that dl has been realized. As the costs for an agenda-setter are ﬁxed,
a citizen who applies for agenda-setting and who is recognized as such proposes the
maximum level of public goods that will be supported by the electorate. The candidate
proposal (Q∗l,t−za = K(Q∗l)) is supported by a share of ˆ ml voters, and the proposal will
be accepted, since T ≤ T l and the vote threshold ˆ ml applies.
Any proposal (Q,t−za = K(Q)) with Q > Q∗l would be rejected, as fewer than ˆ ml voters
will support the proposal and ˆ mh ≥ ˆ ml supporting votes would be required. Hence the
candidate proposal is optimal.
Following the same logic as in Proposition 1, all citizens will apply for agenda-setting.
23Step 2: Suppose that dh has been realized. Any agenda-setter will propose (Q∗h,t−za =
K(Q∗h)) in this case.
The proposal would be supported by ˆ mh voters. As T > T l, the required threshold is
also ˆ mh, so the proposal is adopted. A higher level of public goods would be supported
by a fraction of voters less than ˆ mh.
By the same logic as in Proposition 1, all citizens will apply for agenda-setting. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3
The monotonicity condition implies that the two possible states of the world, h and l,







ˆ mA for T > T B,
ˆ mB for T ≤ T B.
Step 1: Suppose that ωB has been realized. Suppose that an individual is recognized
as the agenda-setter. By the same line of reasoning as in Proposition 2, he proposes
(Q∗B,t−za = ωBK(Q∗B)), which is supported by a share of ˆ mB voters and accepted,
since T ≤ T B and the vote threshold ˆ mB applies. Any proposal (Q,t−za = ωBK(Q))
with Q > Q∗B would be rejected, as strictly fewer than ˆ mB voters would support the
proposal and ˆ mA ≥ ˆ mB supporting voters would be required. Following the same logic
as in Proposition 1, all citizens will apply for agenda-setting.
Step 2: Suppose that ωA has been realized. Again, using the same logic, an agenda-
setter will propose (Q∗A,t−za = ωAK(Q∗A)), which will be adopted as it is supported
by ˆ mA voters. A strictly higher level of the public good would not be adopted, as it
would be supported by a strictly smaller measure of voters than ˆ mA, while the required
threshold would be ˆ mA since the corresponding tax-level would be strictly higher than
T A ≥ T B. Again, all citizens apply for agenda-setting. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that state X ∈ {A,B,C,D} has been realized, associated with the event
(di,ωj), i,j ∈ {l,h}. Suppose that an individual is recognized as the agenda-setter.
We claim that he will propose (Q = QX,t−za = ωjK(QX) = T X).
The candidate proposal is supported by a share of ˆ mX voters. The proposal will be
accepted, since T ≤ T X and a vote threshold of at most ˆ mX applies. Any proposal
24(Q,t−za = ωjK(Q)) with Q > QX would be rejected, since strictly fewer than ˆ mX
voters would support the proposal, but, as we have already pointed out above, just before
Proposition 4, at least ˆ mX supporting voters would be required. Every agenda-setter
proposes the maximum level of public goods that will be supported by the electorate.
Any proposal (Q,t−za = ωjK(Q)) with Q < QX will not maximize the utility of the
agenda-setter, hence such a proposal will not be made. The candidate proposal is,
therefore, optimal.
Following the same logic as in Proposition 1, all citizens will apply for agenda-setting.
¤
Proof of Proposition 5
Step 1: We construct a Pareto-improvement. Making a proposal with Q > 0 that is a
Pareto-improvement over the status quo requires that
s
L = t,
since there is an individual with z = 0 and thus individuals rejecting the proposal need
to be compensated for their taxes.
Step 2: Suppose that a level Q > 0 is proposed. The budget constraint is





which implicitly determines the tax rate t. A share of F(t/Q) individuals have to be
subsidized by sL = t. Costs to provide the public good and subsidies have to be covered
by taxes.
Step 3: We prove point (i). Let us choose κ such that F(κ) = 1
2. Let us choose ˆ Q to be
arbitrarily small. Hence K00( ˆ Q) ˆ Q < 1
2κ. For t = κ ˆ Q, the left-hand side of equation (3)
is larger than the right-hand side, as
K









For t = 0, the right-hand side is larger than the left-hand side. Hence, by the Interme-
diate Value Theorem, there exists ˆ t such that




25with ˆ t < κ ˆ Q and F(ˆ t/ ˆ Q) < 1
2.
Hence, if we set







and invoke the no-switching assumption, constitution ˜ C1 will implement ˆ Q. This is a
Pareto-improvement, as a fraction ˆ m of individuals is better oﬀ with the public good
and paying ˆ t, and a fraction 1 − ˆ m is better oﬀ with the public good, as they receive
subsidies sL = ˆ t. Only an individual with z = 0 is indiﬀerent between the status quo
and providing ˆ Q















The budget constraint is




This equation has a unique solution at t∗ = 1
4. We set ˆ m = 1
2. At a tax rate t∗ = 1
4 all
citizens with z > 1
2 have a utility zQ∗ − t∗ > 0. All individuals with z < 1
2 would be
worse oﬀ without subsidization. With subsidies their utility is zQ∗. Example A proves
(ii).
Example B: Again let K(Q) = 1
2Q2 and let f(z) = 2 − 2z, which yields F(z) = 2z − z2.
















which has no solution in the interval [0;Q∗]. This example proves (iii). ¤
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